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Mechanics" Liens in Canada. By MAcKLEM AND BRisTOW. TORONTO:
Tm CARSWELL Co. LTD., 1962, pp. 476.
Since the first Mechanics' Lien Act in Canada, was passed in
Ontario in 1873, Mechanics' Lien Law has been steadily progressing
and expanding across the land. The Mechanics' Lien Act was first
introduced to expand credit in the growing building industry, while
at the same time providing security and protection for the building
supplier, the mortgagee and others, who would be vitally concerned
with the building project under way.
This new book on Mechanics' Liens in Canada-by Messrs.
Macklem and Bristow brings all the law on the subject right up to
date. Both of the authors, David I. Bristow and Douglas N. Macklem
are young men, who in preparing this text in the year 1962, have
brought to their task, not only the talent of kmowing their law on
the subject, but they have had the advantage of 'wide experience
in the Courts on the subject.
For instance, the full impact of the "trust fund" section in the
Mechanics' Lien Act was never fully comprehended until about
1955. That section is Section 3, in the B.C. Act1 and in the Ontario
Act.2 The case of Minneapolis-HoneywellRegulator Co. Ltd. v. Irvine
and Reeves Ltd. and Empire Brass3 was fought right to the Supreme
Court of Canada-and it was finally established-that the supplier
or other claimant does not require to be a lienholder to participate
in any such "trust fund"-and further that "this Trust section is a
separate and distinct remedy from the Mechanics' Lien, and is
asserted, not against the owner-but against the Contract price
in the hands of the Contractor who is primarily liable for the claim".
This case was followed by a series of important cases in Ontario
-commencing with In Re Davidson Co. 4 -where upon the bankruptcy
of the contractor company, there remained a large hold-back in the
hands of the owner, a School Board, and although some lien claimants
failed to prove their liens, they were permitted to share par passu,
on the balance of the statutory fund-after the lien holders, since
they had done work and supplied material to the job and were
entitled to protection under the section upon the fund.
Following this there has been a series of cases directed against
the bank in each case (the banker for the building contractor):
Fonthill Lumber v. Bank of Montrea 5 and Troup v. Royal Bank6
where Porter, C.J.O. -stated the principal as follows:
"The test to be applied is whether the bank manager knew that the
customer was committing a breach of trust and he knowingly partici1 R.S.B.C. 1960, c. 238.
2 R.S.O. 1960, c. 233.
3 [1954] 1 D.L.R. 678 (B.C.S.C.); [1954] 4 D.L.R. 800 (B.C.C.A.); [1955]
S.C.R. 694.
4 [1957] O.W.N. 223.
5 [1959] O.R. 451.
6 [1961] O.R. 455.

19631

Book Reviews

pated therein. In my view it has not been clearly demonstrated on the

evidence that to the knowledge of the bank manager there were unpaid
accounts of workmen and for supplies or that they would not be paid.
The evidence in this case is clear that at all material times he did not
know and therefore could not have participated in any breach of trust.
I think that the effect would be the same even if the bank manager
had been aware of the provisions of The Mechanics' Lien Act." 7
The appeal on this Judgment was dismissed by the Supreme
Court of Canada in June 1962.8
It has been settled law under all the Acts for many years, that
rental equipment used on the job-by a contractor or sub-contractor,
could not be the subject of a mechanics' lien, because it was not
supplied "to be used". But the law now appears to be progressing
somewhat again, and on p. 189 of the text the authors note that in
In Re Arthur J. Lennox Contractors Ltd. (No. 1)-"Smily, J. expressed the opinion:
"....

that persons whose claims are for the rental of equipment are not

beneficiaries of the trust fund since the protection
given by the Act is
9
only for work done and materials supplied." He did say, however, that
if the claim for work done by the workman, who had been supplied
with the equipment and had worked on the job in connection with it,

could be separated from the claim of the lessor for the actual rental
of the equipment it would seem reasonable to allow such a claim as
one for work done within the meaning of the Act."
Finally the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada (22nd January
1963) setting aside the judgment in Ace Lumber Ltd. v. Cflarkson 0
seems to have stifled the matter-in that, it was held that the
supply of retaining equipment for poured concrete on a rental basis
did not give a lien to the supplier as a "person who performs a
service" within the meaning of the Act. The learned authors have
covered this phase of the law, fully in their text.
There had been many instances in building contract law, where
owners, architects and others have been overzealous in retaining
the quantum of the statutory holdback under the Act. In the
Ontario Act it is Section 11, and it provides in effect that the owner
or person primarily liable must hold back at all times 15% or 20%
of the value of the work done, or material supplied based on the
contract price etc. In all building contracts the provisions of the
Mechanics' Lien Act, are sacrosanct and govern. It is not 15% or
20% of each payment under the contract that must be held backit is as Chief Justice McRuer decided in Dziewa v. Havilandn--"15%
or 20% of the value of the work done or material supplied at the
date of such payment based on the contract price". This summation
of the law is clearly expressed by the learned authors in their text.
7Ibid., at p. 461.
8 (1962) 34 D.L.R. (2d) 556.
938 C.B.R. 97, but see In Northwoast Forest Products Ltd. v. Eakins
ConstructionLtd. (1960) 26 D.L.R. (2d) 251.
10 [19621 O.R. 748.
11 [19601 O.W.N. 343.
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The status of the mortgagee in competition with Mechanics'
Liens cannot be too strongly called attention to, as the authors do
in their book. Fundamentally there are only two kinds of mortgages
under the act:-"The prior mortgage within the meaning of the
Act"; 12 and the "subsequent mortgage within the meaning of; the
Act."13
"The prior mortgage within the meaning of the Act", gets its
protection, to the extent of the actual value of the land and premises
at the time the first lien arose. Since it existed in fact before the
first lien arose-that is-the first work was done-it cannot be
improved out of the security that it then had, but has security only,
of course, to the extent of the actual value of the land and building
at that time. Cook v. Belshaw' 4 and Cook v. Koldoffsky,' 5 are the
fundamental cases to know. But see pages 108 to 111 of the Macklem
and Bristow text.
"The subsequent mortgagee within the meaning of the act"16
is a mortgage which only arises after the first lien arises-and all
advances on such mortgage made, without any lien being registered,
and without written notice of any lien get full protection as against
liens under the Act The rights and liabilities of the subsequent
mortgagee are clearly and succinctly dealt with by the authors on
page 114 of the Text.
As to the status of a bonus in "a subsequent mortgage within
the meaning of the act", attention should be given to Ontario Hardwood Flooring Co. v. Dowbenko.' 7 As to a bonus "in a prior mortgage within the meaning of the Act" the fundamental case to which
8
reference should be had is Gooding v. Crocker.1
The Ontario Act 1 9 exempts from liens claims, public streets
or highways or any work or improvements done or caused to be
done by a municipal corporation thereon. This section has been the
cause of much futile litigation, and almost downright fraud particularly where sewer sub-contractors and sewer supply houses have done
work and supplied material to impecunious general contractors
who have taken the job too cheaply or where the contract moneys
have been pocketed. There is little or no relief and the practitioner
will be well advised to consider carefully Section 17 of the text"Roads and Streets".
I repeat what has been said by many Judges that too much
time is taken up, with evidence on almost routine matters, which
could be abridged, to the advantages of all parties, by the use of
12R.S.O. 1960, c. 233, s. 7(3).
13 R.S.O. 1960, c. 233, s. 13(1).
14 (1892-93) 23 O.R. 545.
15 (1915-16), 35 O.L.R. 555.
16 Supra, footnote 13.
17 [1957] O.W.N. 177.
1S (1926-27), 60 O.L.R. 60; (1926-27), 31 O.W.N. 327.
19 Supra, footnote 13, s. 2.
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experts by the Court--as under Section 47(3)20 of the Act. I
commend to the practitioner Section 118 of the text "Expert Witnesses".
All in all I have found this text, to be a competent, complete
and up to the minute exposition of Mechanics' Liens Law in Canada.
I have read the text carefully, since over the years I have kept
up faithfully will all recorded decisions and there is nothing missing. I would not think that any practitioner could possibly practise
in the field of Mechanics' Liens without a copy of this text in his
library.
HAROLD W. TnMinws*

The Law of Competition in Canada. By RICHARD GOSSE. TORONTO:
THE CARSWELL COMPANY LIMITED 1962. Pp. xvi., 357.
There are two principal ways of critically approaching a work
such as the present one. The reviewer can ascertain the stated or
presumed objective of the author, accept it without criticism and
appraise the author's success in achieving what he set out to do. This
approach proceeds on the assumption that one should not criticise
someone for not doing what he intended to do.
The alternative approach is to criticise the author because he
hasn't written the book you wanted him to write, or at least to
consider whether the book meets a real need of the moment, and
if it does not, whether the author might have met the real need.
While it is a fact of human nature that one responds more to
the timely than to the untimely or the not so timely, it is nonetheless
the task of the reviewer who aims to be something more than a
reporter of his own prejudices to be wary of resting his judgment
too much on the sheer factor of timeliness.
It should accordingly be stated immediately that any contribution to the law of competition in Canada as it now stands is timely
for a number of reasons. First, there is the general fact of our
times involving economies of scale and the general existence of what
the economists term "imperfect" or "monopolistic" competition, as
opposed to the "perfect" competition that never existed except in
the ivory towers of the economists. Second, there are the increasingly monopolistic influences of patents, secret know-how and trademarks on the one hand which are lined up against the competitioninducing existence of alternative products, materials and services for
similar end purposes on the other. Third, Canada faces an increasingly competitive world where the National Policy tariff induced
branch plant psychology and fragmented production units of much
2
0 Supra, footnote 13, s. 47(3).
*Judge, County of York, Toronto.

